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HUMAN RIGHTS IN AUSTRALIA 
Their relevance to the vulnerable and marginalised 
LIZ CURRAN 
Fostering the better protection of human rights 
It is a difficult predicament, in the current legal and political climate, to work in a legal practice where the clients are economically and socially 
disadvantaged and powerless. Sometimes, being an academic who is supposed to grapple with the theoretical and philosophical concepts in 
academic journals comes into conflict with the realities and practicalities of working as a clinical supervising solicitor in this academic role in a 
disadvantaged suburb of Melbourne. Yet from this vantage point, being an academic and a practitioner, a constructive inter-play occurs where theory 
can inform practice and vice versa. It is this inter-play which can make a valuable contribution to policy debates. From such a vantage point, I 
consider it incumbent on universities and policy-makers to tap into the experience of the day-to-day dilemmas facing members of the community for 
whom survival, emotional and physical well-being are precarious. With exposure to this in an academic/practitioner role, the theory and real life 
strategies can intersect to ensure strategies are realistic and can make a difference.  
This article challenges the prevailing ‘legalistic’ approach to human rights, where court litigation tends to be considered as the means by which 
human rights can be enforced. The new human rights legislation in Victoria and the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) — with Western Australia 
and Tasmania examining the possibilities for legislation — offer broader opportunities for improving the human condition of people on Australian 
shores. Furthermore, since the Rudd government was elected there may be brighter prospects for human rights protection at a federal level. The new 
human rights mechanisms in Victoria and the ACT present opportunities beyond litigation which can be utilised to ensure a culture of human rights 
develops in legislatures and bureaucrats and how they administer their policies on the ground. Audits, parliamentary scrutiny processes and direct 
mediation with regional public authorities are all fertile ground to enforce the human rights of community members. 
From my position as a community lawyer in a disadvantaged community, the limitations of a legalistic approach to human rights, without its 
grounding in the day–to-day realities of community, is highly problematic.1 From this perspective, a human rights framework that consists of 
only civil and political rights, or which requires clients to use the courts to complain of ill-treatment, fails to recognise the integral connection 
between the economic and social position of human beings and their capacity to exercise civil and political rights.2 Such a legalistic approach to 
human rights can overlook other opportunities for cultural change, negotiation and dialogue, which a less adversarial environment than the legal 
system can allow. These opportunities will be discussed in this article. The legal system certainly has a place within the human rights 
framework; however, debates should also be constructed around the need to adhere to human rights and how to best foster such adherence before 
matters are the subject of complaint. In other words, how can a respect for human rights become entrenched in day-to-day dealings with each 
other? Evans has argued that the human rights debate needs to be widened to have a ‘focus beyond the legislative process’.3  
From my perspective, the offerings of a legalistic approach to human rights are restrictive in that some clients lack the money, power, capacity, 
confidence and knowledge to even realise their human rights. This article will discuss modest research undertaken by Mary Anne Noone and myself, 
which demonstrates this point.4 A purely legalistic approach to human rights, with the limitations imposed by rules and procedures, not only constrains 
the opportunities for human rights mechanisms and frameworks to be applied more broadly but means that those who will be able to take advantage of 
their rights are people who have the resources to navigate these rules and procedures.5 Such a concentration on legalistic approaches can also provide 
ammunition for those opposed to human rights protection.6  
Lessons to be learned from the United Kingdom 
In the United Kingdom (UK), some powerful media interests and opponents see human rights as the domain of the legal: judges, politicians and 
lawyers. The Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) is seen as being used by those considered unpopular, mainly because these groups are already within 
the legal system. Such groups include asylum seekers, defendants and prisoners. Whilst these people’s rights are just as important as those in the 
rest of the community, it nevertheless enables opponents to label human rights as an ‘industry for lawyers’.  
The UK experience of their Human Rights Act reveals that, although the Act has improved many facets of life, it has also been used as a public 
‘whipping boy’ and is blamed for decisions that do not actually pertain to the Act.7 This is unfortunate and reflects the more sensational 
coverage which some media are prone to, rather than reportage of the actual facts behind many of the cases. It also highlights the dangers of 
narrowly constraining the definition of human rights to the civil and political rights sphere. As a lawyer and civil libertarian, on many occasions 
I have witnessed arguments that devalue economic, cultural and social rights in order to give precedence to civil and political rights. The latter 
are often seen in legal arenas as ‘higher order rights’. Perhaps such attitudes are more reflective of the socially and economically privileged 
position of many in the legal profession rather than an accurate reflection of the positioning of human rights in international law.8 These views 
conflict with the fundamental notions of human rights being inviolable, indivisible and inalienable. 
Recently, at a Public Interest Advocacy Centre9 conference in Sydney, a former parliamentarian argued that the most prudent course of action 
for advocates for bills or charters of human rights is to settle for civil and political rights and not agitate for the inclusion of economic, social, 
cultural and other rights, as this could be fatal to any such bill.10 Such arguments not only fail to understand the importance of economic and 
social rights to the general population,11 but also risk thwarting the longevity of statutory human rights measures as the more narrow and 
legalistic rights come to be seen as ‘exclusive’, ‘selective’ and utilised only by a few ‘sectional’ interests. By contrast, human rights protections 
can and should offer opportunities for all human beings to maximise their potential and be treated with respect and dignity.12 As Gearty has 
argued, if the manner of articulating the importance of human rights is not sophisticated and representative, then human rights arguments will be 
greeted without warmth and with blank indifference or mute incomprehension.13 Worse still, they will be manipulated and commandeered to the 
point where they can be used to justify the undermining of human rights. Gearty, Charlesworth and Williams have highlighted how human rights 
language can be twisted so as to actually allow for incursions of human rights.14 
The distortion of human rights by ‘cherry picking’ civil and political rights and making human rights overly legalistic makes it easier for 
opponents to thwart future human rights frameworks in Australia. In the end, the people affected — for whom social and economic as well as 
cultural rights are important — go unrealised and are forgotten. As a consequence, their civil and political rights are also never realised. Gearty 
warns: 
It follows that, at its core, human rights is a subject that is concerned with the outsider, with the marginalised, and with the powerless – these are the various 
individuals who in any given culture or time are most likely to be invisible to those around them, who are most liable to find themselves pushed beyond the 
periphery of a community’s field of vision, all who are viewed as a non- or sub-human if they are seen it is these people who need human rights protection the 
most.15 
The human rights of the vulnerable and disadvantaged  
Many vulnerable and disadvantaged groups are reliant on government agencies for support and subsistence. Accordingly, they are susceptible to 
infringements of their rights by agents of government.16 The Audit Committee in the UK17 has indicated there is still a lot of work to be done to 
change entrenched culture and equip government agencies to conceive of their role in enabling the human rights of citizens in how they 
administer government policies. There is a lesson in this recommendation in Australian jurisdictions as each state and territory rolls out its 
human rights framework. If training civil servants and their agencies on human rights is to be effective it must be regular and resourced, 
especially in view of high staff turnover. It must be more than just a formulaic or ‘tick a box’ approach to human rights compliance. 
So how can human rights be utilised by those without money, resources, or power?  
For many of my clients, the issues foremost in their minds are: maintaining adequate affordable housing; ill-health; remaining in school or work; 
having adequate income support to pay for food, health care, pharmaceuticals, and other basic necessities; mental health issues; drug and alcohol 
addictions, often induced by trauma; lack of social support, particularly for the elderly and those with an intellectual disability; and coping with 
discrimination. These issues are mainly economic, social and cultural rights, although many may have a civil and political rights dimension that 
can come into play. All of these need to be dealt with in a holistic way rather than taking a ‘cherry picking’ approach to human rights.  
What my clients want above all are solutions to their problems, a decent standard of living and to be treated with decency and respect. All of 
these elements are consistent with human rights which governments are required to adhere to and/or progressively work towards.18 These items 
go beyond what can be provided by litigation; they extend to how people are treated in their day-to-day lives by the community, the government 
and its agencies. They also relate to the provision of resources and services that are necessary for an adequate standard of living. 
Politicians and bureaucrats can easily claim that human rights are being adhered to, but these claims may not accurately accord with the 
experience of people on the ground.19 Accordingly, for compliance to occur it is not merely a matter of self-auditing by Parliament and the 
public service but also measuring the experience of people affected. In a modest trial of research methodology, Mary Anne Noone and I (Curran 
and Noone) have endeavoured to develop a process for measuring people’s experience of human rights which could be utilised to fill this void. 
This will be discussed later in this article.  
Beyond formal legal structural approaches: the potential for human rights 
protection 
Evans, noting the reticence of national government in Australia to implement a bill of rights, has explored ways in which human rights 
compliance might be integrated into the policy-making and legislative process and he sets out a constructive proposal.20 He has examined the use 
of Regulatory Impact Statements on legislation and policy initiatives and their independent monitoring by the Office of Regulation Review and 
argues that similarly, a model for Human Rights Impact Statements21 could be adopted with Statements to be reviewed by a statutory entity such 
as the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission. He notes the limitations of parliamentary scrutiny committees, which still have a 
place, but argues that early on in the process, there are opportunities for human rights considerations to inform policy analysis and deliberations 
as part of the existing repertoire. Kelly has observed that the institutionalisation of human rights at a policy-making and legislative level will be 
‘invisible to practitioners and the public, in many respects it is where the biggest impact of the Act22 will be felt’.23 
This author argues that similarly, as a complement to human rights mechanisms involving the Executive, Parliament, the civil service and the courts, 
other methods are needed to benchmark and measure people’s actual experience of human rights compliance on the ground. This then complements 
policy-making initiatives to ensure that the bold statements about human rights compliance by both politicians and bureaucrats can be tested and 
verified. Such a measure brings the notion of human rights and democracy together as those who are likely to be affected by government legislation, 
policy and its administration are able to share their experience as befits participatory democracy.  
Unfortunately, this proposal will be met with initial resistance as those in power rarely wish to hear the negative elements of their policy’s 
impacts. However, if parliamentarians want to stay in touch, develop good policies and avoid criticism, gathering information on a regular basis 
on how people’s human rights are affected by policies on the ground can lead to better and more informed policymaking. It averts pitfalls before 
they occur. Both the positive and negative aspects of policies may also be identified and give improved opportunities for fixing unintended 
consequences of legislation, policies and administration.  
To this end, Curran and Noone in a recent modest trial explored a new methodology that seeks to measure people’s experience of human rights. This 
demonstrates that the task is not impossible. It is the funding for the conduct of such research that will be critical if the rhetoric around human rights 
implementation is to be tested in the community. In view of modest funding, the trial of the methodology examined only one human right: the right to 
social security.24 The approach used internationally-recognised rights ratified by Australia; developed indicators as to what would be needed were the 
right to be implemented; measured the experience of people by benchmarking them against the indicators required for the human rights to be adhered 
to; and drew conclusions. The details of the methodology and the outcomes of this research are articulated in a conference paper and in a recent 
report.25 The methodology could be utilised more extensively in the future to test people’s experience of a range of other human rights through the use 
of focus groups and, only where appropriate, surveys as occurred in the research project. In addition to the need to measure people’s actual experience 
of human rights, there are further measures that need to be adopted if vulnerable and marginalised groups are to reap any benefits from human rights 
mechanisms. 
The problems for vulnerable and marginalised groups: a need for greater 
knowledge, capacity, support and capability 
The research of Curran and Noone — which was very modest due to limited funding; the small sample of people who participated in the suburb of 
West Heidelberg; and the fact it was only a trial of new methodology — revealed that both service providers and service users had very little 
knowledge or understanding of social security as a human right or their rights at law. The overwhelming majority of participants had little 
information, knowledge or understanding of the methods by which such treatment could be addressed, including that there were legal aspects to 
the problem and that legal advice could be sought. Few people were aware of their rights or remedies when their right to social security was 
infringed or when Centrelink officers treated them inappropriately. 
Participants expressed a high level of fear about reprisals for complaining about their treatment, as many service users believed that, if they 
challenged a decision or their treatment, they might jeopardise future payments. 
When a right is threatened or curtailed, knowledge and the capacity and confidence to exercise that right are necessary pre-conditions to 
receiving an effective remedy. Without information and knowledge about the right to social security and the norms of appropriate treatment, and 
in the absence of the capacity or confidence to pursue the right, it is unlikely that the right will be realised. Hence, the international benchmarks 
for the right are not met.  
The research by Curran and Noone revealed participants had little knowledge, capacity or confidence and were unable to exercise their rights 
even in the context of likely infringement of their rights. Supportive of these research findings are findings of Rebecca Sandefur, who conducted 
research into money and housing problems in the United States. She states that: 
[t]he implication of this body of research is that people whose social position is near the bottom of an unequal structure will be the less likely to take actions that 
might protect and further their own interests.26 
In addition, research findings (again consistent with Curran and Noone, and with Sandefur27) by the UK’s Legal Services Research Centre 
(LSRC) notes that the results from their 2004 Civil Social Justice Survey across England and Wales found that often people thought seeking 
advice would make little difference; they were uncertain about what to do and where to get help or they felt that nothing could be done. Self-
esteem affected their ability, as did entrenched avoidance behaviour that was often linked to previous experience, life circumstances and the 
availability of support networks. All of these factors were found to affect why people did not take action and it was noted that these factors were 
often accompanied by anxiety.28  
This body of research reveals that people’s state of knowledge about their rights and whether they have the capability, wherewithal and confidence 
to access their rights can influence their ability to have their rights enforced. The Curran and Noone research also highlights the impediments for 
people in West Heidelberg in accessing their legal rights where they lack the relevant knowledge and where the administrative system itself seems 
to compound these impediments.  
In the context of the realities for vulnerable and marginalised members of our community, such research can inform the delivery of legal and 
other services. It points not only to the need for legal and other services to be more proactive, holistic, multi-disciplinary and outreach-based, but 
also suggests that community education is needed with improved strategies to deliver relevant information to vulnerable and disadvantaged 
groups in an accessible, timely and digestible form.  
The LSRC has stated that: 
Not doing anything about the problem points to the lack of knowledge about the seriousness of the problem and what action to take, and being able to handle a 
problem alone requires expertise, confidence and also monetary resources. It is certainly the case that sometimes people are more than able to deal with 
problems alone, and sometimes it might be reasonable to make no attempt to resolve the problem. No one strategy to deal with problems can be universally 
prescribed. However, particularly for those people who face problems of social exclusion, and may be the least able to solve problems themselves, clear 
information and assistance may be vital to enable them to escape from civil justice problems that might well act to entrench or even worsen their predicament.29 
The experience in the United Kingdom 
The experience in the UK can provide some lessons on the important role of training and education, not just of agencies working with people 
but also of members within the community itself, which can make a serious impact upon human rights compliance.30 It requires government 
and funders to recognise the role of non-government organisations in fearless advocacy on behalf of the community. It also requires significant 
commitment and resourcing to enable capacity building, empowerment and infrastructure for communities of marginalised groups and those 
within locations of disadvantage.  
In the UK, subsequent to training of workers in agencies and local community members, there was a demonstrable increase in the use of the 
Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) by these people to raise issues of human rights non-compliance and unlawful activity.31 For these groups litigation 
was not an option for reasons of cost; a lack of access to legal advice or representation; the trauma of legal action; and the nature of the 
adversarial system. In a manner largely ‘invisible to practitioners and the public’,32 these workers and community members were able to raise 
agencies’ non-compliance and breaches of human rights directly with those agencies and were able to secure better treatment and compliance 
with human rights standards. As stated earlier, this highlights that by taking only a legalistic approach to human rights, opportunities for clients 
can be lost. Human rights mechanisms offer potential and great opportunities for many vulnerable and marginalised in our community who often 
cannot access the legal system with its formal thresholds, procedures and significant costs.  
Work done at this day-to-day level with agencies by advocates and citizens needs to be acknowledged and facilitated as it is a significant area in 
which the human rights of all people can be enhanced. The groups in the UK that benefited from changes in practice due to the activities of these 
trained workers (which include lawyers, advocates and community services) have empowered citizens from a wide section of the population 
including parents of school children; the elderly; people with mental illness; and people with a disability. The opportunities for negotiating with 
authorities for improved treatment based on these human rights frameworks need to be acknowledged and celebrated just as much as the 
formalised legal opportunities for greater compliance with human rights.  
Properly arming advocacy groups, locating them in areas and communities of disadvantage (as is occurring in South Africa) and equipping and 
training communities in how they can respond to human rights infringements are ways in which the potential of human rights frameworks can be 
maximised.33 This also requires advocacy groups themselves to be willing to be trained in human rights standards and for their organisations to 
endorse and support them. If this can occur then they will be better equipped to use the new human rights frameworks to the advantage of their 
clients/patients/community members. 
Conclusion 
If human rights are to be effectively protected and adhered to, then they need to be owned by all and based on what civilises — concepts of 
decency; compassion;34 social cohesion; humanity; ethics;35 deliberation;36 good will; and collaboration.37 Those most likely to experience 
human rights intrusions also need to be protected and the general population must be given clear explanations as to why they are being protected 
so it understands, owns and claims the rights for all.38 In addition, it is imperative that those on the margins, who so often lack a space to be 
heard due to the absence of power, money, political clout and reluctance of the media to convey the matters that concern them, are given a voice.  
A selective approach to human rights protection that limits definitions of human rights only to the sphere of political and civil rights, as is the 
case with human rights legislation in Victoria, the ACT and the UK, is unfortunate and reduces opportunities for fundamental reform to benefit 
those most excluded and likely to have their human rights infringed. The language of human rights, as Gearty argues, should give voice and 
represent the language of hospitality, kindliness and compassion as well as providing an ethical frame.39 South Africa’s human rights framework 
took an expansive view of human rights which includes economic and social rights and accordingly enables much to be predicated on this 
foundation.40 In areas of health and social housing, the human rights framework under chapter two of their Bill of Rights has been successfully 
used to force the government to protect people in townships.41  
For a long time, there has been discourse which tries to devalue the economic, cultural and social rights in favour of civil and political rights. 
They should be seen as interdependent, interrelated and indivisible with other rights, rather than as rights in competition with each other.42 They 
are ‘indispensable for dignity and free development of his [or her] personality’.43 It is access to conditions of subsistence, health, education 
which, in an extended sense, allow for liberty, freedom and participation. Without basic conditions for life to flourish and be enabled, it is 
unlikely that these civil and political rights will be owned by all. Human rights protection must include equal access to the conditions outlined in 
human rights instruments, including equal access to resources. It must build on the conception of human rights by allowing for the emergence 
and self-development of people’s goals and capacities over time44 — otherwise human rights protections risk gaining the reputation for being the 
purview of the exclusive and unpopular rather than being owned by everyone by virtue of merely being human.45  
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